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The Flagship Institution of Cold War
Turcology
Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1961-1980
İlker Aytürk
Marie Bossaert and Emmanuel Szurek invited me twice, to İstanbul and Hamburg, for presenting
earlier versions of this article and encouraged me all along. Audiences at the İstanbul workshop
and the Orientalistentag at Hamburg provided comments and suggestions. I must particularly
single out those by Ryosuke Ono. Anonymous reviewers of the EJTS helped me improve the
argument. Finally, Oğuz Can Ok was of great assistance in doing research, sorting out research
material and preparing the tables. My thanks go to all.
1 Sometime  in  1966 or  1967,  a  phone  rang  in  the  office  building  of  Türk  Kültürünü
Araştırma Enstitüsü (Institute for Research on Turkish Culture, hereafter TKAE) at Tunus
Caddesi No. 16 in downtown Ankara. The man in the room, Enver Altaylı, was working
on newspapers and documents from the Soviet Central Asia, which had recently arrived
at the institute library. Enver was quite young at 23, but he already had a very stormy
past behind him. He was born in 1944 in Adana, Turkey into a family of Uzbek refugees.
His father named him after Enver Paşa, who died fighting Bolsheviks and whose name
was etched in the memory of this politically active family. Young Enver enrolled in the
Turkish War College and was expelled from school together with all his schoolmates
after a coup attempt in 1963 by the former school commander, Colonel Talat Aydemir.
Following  that,  he  found  a  temporary  job  as  reporter  at  the  nationalist  daily  Yeni
İstanbul, but clearly reporting was not his forte: Journalism did not quench his passion
for being a mover and shaker. Throughout 1964 and 1965 he supported the nationalist
leader Alparslan Türkeş  and organized the youth branch of the party-in-the-making
(Ülkü 2008: 100-103).
2 When the phone rang, Enver Altaylı  was working at the TKAE as research assistant
upon the recommendation of his former boss at Yeni İstanbul.  His memoirs give the
impression that he had no clue who was calling him. When he picked it up, he was
taken aback to find out that on the other end of the line was Fuat Paşa, otherwise
known as Major General Fuat Doğu, the then recently appointed director of the Turkish
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intelligence (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, hereafter MİT). This was an invitation for a tête-à-
tête meeting with Doğu at a secret MİT office near the Gençlik Parkı in the heart of the
city. During the meeting the same day, Enver Altaylı was recruited for MİT service and
given the code name Ümit (Hope) (Ülkü 2008: 113-114). Little did he know that he would
soon  find  himself  a  major  actor  in  great  power  politics,  rubbing  shoulders  with
presidents,  generals,  politicians,  intellectuals  on the  one hand,  and informants  and
secret agents on the other. 
3 The fact that Altaylı got employed at the TKAE in the first place and that he received
that fateful phone call from Fuat Paşa at his office were by no means a coincidence. For
a good part of its early history (and probably thereafter, too), the TKAE stood at the
center of crisscrossing relationships between the Turkish government, the military, the
secret service, the academia, right-wing print media and right-wing intellectuals. It was
an open secret  that  behind the façade of  an academic research institute,  the TKAE
served as the rallying point against, first, left-wing activism in Turkey, and, second, the
Soviet Union. 
4 In this article, I focus on the role of the TKAE in Cold War Turcology, that is, from its
foundation in 1961 to 1980. Within this framework, I aim to address three broad sets of
questions. First, taking my cue from the burgeoning field of cultural Cold War studies, I
want  to  throw  some  light  on  the  interaction  between  the  international  and  the
domestic, and see how the Cold War imposed a straightjacket on social sciences and
humanities in Turkey, in general, and on the field of Turcology, in particular. In other
words, what was the role of the Cold War and Cold War actors in shaping frameworks of
intellectual debate and production of knowledge in Turkey? How can we uncover traces
of  this  interaction  between  the  international  and  the  domestic?  What  particular
evidence  should  we  be  looking  for:  Bilateral  relations  between Turkey  and  foreign
actors (in this case, the USA)? Financial and infrastructural support from abroad? Or,
the export of institutions and institutional experience? Second, I will problematize the
agency of the state. How and why did the Turkish state get involved in Turcological
debates? Why did the state assemble and maintain “friendly” networks of academics,
artists  and  intellectuals  to  produce  and  disseminate  “convenient”  knowledge?
Furthermore, are we talking about a monolithic state,  or can we actually break the
seemingly singular “state agent” down into its components? Who or which actors acted
in the name of the state? Did those actors speak with one voice, or did they fight over
policy?  What  insights  do  such  conflicts  give  us  on  the  proverbial  polarization  in
modern Turkish  politics  between civil/military  bureaucrats  and elected  politicians?
Third, does this micro-level study on one particular institution allow us to question,
and even challenge, a long-standing cliché in modern Turkish history? Contrary to the
established wisdom, which posits mutual loathing between Kemalist state elites and
right-wingers of all sorts during the multiparty period, is TKAE one example of many
avenues of cooperation between the two groups, based on common interests?
5 Doing research on the TKAE is  a  doubly  difficult  task  for  a  historian of  ideas.  The
difficulty partly stems from the fact that Cold War studies in Turkey have so far been
the exclusive preserve of international relations scholars, who, of course, approached
the  subject  from a  security  perspective.  The  impact  of  the  Cold  War  on  wholesale
transformation of Turkish society, economy, military and bureaucracy, not to speak of
the redrawing of the ideological map in post-1945 Turkey, largely escaped the attention
of scholars. We must admit that the Cold War factor in modern Turkish studies is an
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extremely  understudied  topic  (Örnek et  al  2013;  Örnek 2015;  Işıksel  2014)  and this
neglect becomes all the more deplorable, when the Cold War has become a very fruitful
field of research in the past 20 years, especially in NATO countries. Cultural, social and
humanities aspects of the Cold War in Turkey certainly deserve consideration and I
would argue that this is a prerequisite to understanding Turkey’s current political class
and  senior  bureaucrats,  most  of  whom  are  shaped  by  and  products  of  Cold  War
conditions.
6 To make things worse, there is also a problem of sources. Official documents of the
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the TKAE had its initial institutional home,
and MİT, which gave constant support throughout,  are currently classified and will
likely remain so in the foreseeable future. The founders’ generation has also passed
away, so doing oral history for the early years of this institution would not yield an
insider’s view either. In the absence of those sources, one could hardly ascertain facts
and write a definitive study free of speculation. In other words, scholars who want to
do  research  on  the  TKAE  –  and  on  much  of  post-1945  republican  history  –
unfortunately have to start by recognizing this limitation and should seek to meet the
challenge by exploiting alternative sources. In the case of the TKAE, data need to be
collected painstakingly from two open sources: TKAE publications, on the one hand,
and memoirs, on the other. The number of books, academic or otherwise, published by
the TKAE has now exceeded several hundred and, once in a while, their forewords and
introductions  contain  hints  that  can  be  used  to  re-construct  institutional  history.
Likewise, the institute journal Türk Kültürü (Turkish Culture), currently running into its
55th volume, and other occasional books and brochures that deal with the history of
the  TKAE  contain  useful  evidence.  However,  by  far  the  most  important  source  for
understanding why the TKAE was founded, how it worked, which principles guided its
activities, and, finally, how it became a burden and gradually faded into unimportance
in the late 1970s, is memoirs of people who were either affiliated with the institute or
whose work shaped the institute’s fortunes. Two memoirs, one by the founding director
of the TKAE, Ahmet Temir, and the other by the former MİT operative, Enver Altaylı,
shed light on the foundation and activities of the TKAE during its heyday from 1961 to
the early  1970s  (Temir  2011;  Ülkü 2008).  Very helpful  in  recognizing the American
perspective on the cultural Cold War in Turkey is the biography of Ruzi Nazar, a very
colorful figure who was the CIA case officer in Ankara from 1959 to 1971 (Altaylı 2013).
The  fact  that  this  biography is  written  by  none  other  than Enver  Altaylı,  life-long
associate and friend of Nazar, lays bare the extent of cooperation between Turkish and
American intelligence services during the Cold War. Finally, two more memoirs from
the  1970s,  by  Prime  Minister  Nihat  Erim  (1971-1972)  and  Vice  Premier  Sadi  Koçaş
(1971), help us explain the gradual downsizing of the TKAE in the early 1970s (Erim
2005; Koçaş 1977; Koçaş 1978).
7 In this article, I will first describe the Cold War environment in which the TKAE was
born by putting this  institution into its  international  and domestic contexts in two
separate sections. Proving the convergence of American interests and the interests of
right-wing Turkish elites is going to be my goal here. Next, I will provide information
about the foundation of the TKAE, its institutional structure, membership, aims and
activities.  In  this  section,  I  will  also  make  a  numerical  content  analysis  of
approximately 1800 articles published in the TKAE journal from 1962 to 1980. Finally, I
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will conclude by discussing what the TKAE episode teaches us in understanding Cold
War Turkey.
 
I. Context 1: The International 
8 Until  the  late  1980s,  scholars  of  international  relations  and  security  studies  had
established a virtual monopoly over research on the Cold War (Leffler et al 2010). It was
only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries that a serious
stocktaking  began  and  scholars  from  very  diverse  backgrounds  and  disciplines  got
involved  in  writing  a  total  history  of  the  conflict  that  defined  twentieth  century
politics. For our purposes, the 1990s witnessed the birth of a new field of research, now
called the cultural Cold War, as a result of the widespread recognition that the impact
of  the  Cold  War  went  far  beyond  the  narrow  confines  of  a  military,  political  and
economic conflict between two superpowers. The cultural Cold War was a supplement
to the conflict and waged by the superpowers with three broad expectations: 
a. Maintaining a friendly bloc of artists, intellectuals and opinion leaders at home and
preventing sympathy for, or defection to, the other side,
b. Winning hearts and minds of artists, intellectuals and opinion leaders of the rival
superpower and allies,
c.  Pursuing  the  same  goals  in non-aligned,  or  newly  independent  Third  World
countries.
9 We  know  comparably  little  about  the Soviet  cultural  policy  during  the  Cold  War
(Richmond 2003; Roth-Ey 2011; Tsipursky 2016), but the American side of the story has
now appeared in great detail in a torrent of publications since the 1990s. Although not
the first one to expose the CIA’s involvement in the cultural Cold War, Frances Stonor
Saunders’ 1999 book (Saunders 1999) made the greatest impact and influenced a new
generation of scholars, who put more flesh on the main contours of her argument.
10 The most important discovery by Stonor Saunders was the CIA’s “long leash policy.” As
early as the late 1940s, that is a few years into the Cold War, the CIA operatives in
Europe came to the conclusion that artists and intellectuals in Europe had to be won
over to the American cause, but that it was not that easy to achieve this end with the
tried and tested methods of traditional intelligence warfare. Direct recruitment by the
intelligence service worked successfully in only a handful of cases, and not only did it
not create the expected spill-over effect,  but,  as a method, it  carried the unwanted
potential  to  backfire,  since  the  European  (and  for  that  matter,  American)  art  and
intellectual scene was already left-leaning in the immediate post-WWII years.  These
men and women, who the CIA hoped to recruit for the American cause and to combat
Soviet cultural influence in Europe and the USA, would never have collaborated with an
American  secret  agency  knowingly.  In  other  words,  on  the  part  of  the  artists  and
intellectuals,  any prospective collaboration with the CIA had to be, or at least look,
unintentional: the CIA had to be several steps removed from the target individual with
no face-to-face  interaction and an effort  was  made to  convince  these  unsuspecting
collaborators  that  they  were  serving  higher  moral  principles  such  as  freedom  and
liberty  rather  than  US  national  interests.  CIA  officers,  therefore,  set  up  cover
institutions,  which  posed  as  intellectual  and  art  platforms,  or  as  civil  society
organizations,  but  which  in  effect  shepherded  intellectual  and  art  capital  toward
desired  goals.  The  most  notorious  of  those  proxies  was  the  Congress  for  Cultural
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Freedom (CCF), which maintained offices in all major European countries, published
journals, organized international conferences, art exhibitions and performances, and
all this with CIA money that reached it via secret channels. Established in 1950, the CCF
carried out its mission by cajoling dozens of liberal artists, intellectuals and scholars
into fighting Soviet and communist influence over arts and culture in Europe, until the
exposure of its secret link to the CIA in 1966 (Harris 2016). Likewise, alongside the CIA,
various other American organizations,  too, invested heavily in creating networks of
anticommunist opinion leaders in Europe and in other key countries, which were at the
forefront of the Cold War (Scott-Smith et al 2008; Scott-Smith 2012; van Dongen et al
2014).  All  in all,  the “long leash policy” proved to be a success in the sense that it
motivated  large  numbers  of  liberal  and,  sometimes,  left-leaning  intelligentsia,  who
would not have otherwise supported American interests, to rally against the rigidities
of Soviet-style communism (Whitfield 1996; Dunne 2013; Barnhisel 2015; Doherty 2003;
Prevots 1998; Pavitt 2008; Poiger 2000).
11 What is more, it also provided a model to be emulated in the scholarly world, as well. If
the art and culture scene could be manipulated with a long leash, why should the same
policy not work in the academia, especially during the postwar expansion of the higher
education system in the western world, where thousands of academics were in constant
search of funding and new venues for publication? Indeed, the CIA worked behind the
scene to found the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR (O’Connell 1990) in 1950
with precisely these practical concerns in mind. On the surface, the institute was the
brainchild of eight academic (or semi-academic) refugees from the USSR, who aimed “.
. . to conduct research into the theory and practice of various aspects of the state and
social order of the USSR . . . for the purpose of providing the non-Soviet world . . . with
reliable information on developments in the Soviet Union” (O’Connell 1990: 4). Funding
for  the  institute  personnel  and  activities  came,  seemingly,  from The  Radio  Liberty
Committee, composed of “concerned American citizens,” which also funded the Radio
Liberty that made broadcasts to the Soviet-dominated world (O’Connell 1990: 2). The
institute built a state-of-the-art library, funded research, published books and journals
in many languages, offered a platform for conferences, and even a summer school for
future Sovietologists. Behind that academic façade, however, there was a murky story.
Some of the original eight founders had collaborated with the Nazis during WWII; they
shifted loyalties for a second time and offered their services to the advancing American
forces at the end of the war. At least six out of eight were known to be working for the
CIA by  1950  (O’Connell  1990:  18  and 29).  A  CIA handler,  posing  as  an  advisor,  was
affiliated with the institute and money continued to pour in until 1971, when the CIA
connection was exposed by a maverick US senator, Clifford Case, thereby shattering the
academic respectability of the institute (O’Connell 1990: 2).
12 While the Munich institute never did cutting edge science, it always maintained the
academic  link  and  that  must  have  been  what  mattered  for  the  CIA  above  all.  If  it
ultimately  aimed  to  convince  European  and,  more  importantly,  Third  World
intellectuals that the socialist path to modernity was a recipe for disaster, this message
had to be conveyed with the authoritative tone of a scientist. Of course, it would be
extra helpful if the “scientist” was a former Soviet citizen, who grew up experiencing
first hand shortcomings of the socialist system. 
13 Under conditions of an intellectual war between rival ideologies, questions regarding
the scientificity of their academic work bothered neither producers of knowledge at
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the institute, nor consumers of that knowledge at the other end of the assembly line,
that is as long as the anticommunist scientist got his/her numbers right and conformed
to the established standards of  doing social  science.  Indeed,  when Munich scholars
published, say, damning figures about the state of the Soviet economy, or reports about
the frustration of artists in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe, they did not lie. Their
talks, panels, conferences, reports, articles and books, all pointed at some failing aspect
of variants of socialism as they had been practiced in many socialist countries at the
time. What was problematic about their “academic” work was, however, that they were
not free in their choice of topic, approach or paradigm. Characteristically, all scholars
affiliated with the Munich Institute or who collaborated with it were anticommunists.
Some  were  already  anticommunist  before  and  were  drawn  to  the  institute  by
ideological affinity. Others had to skew their research and findings to make them fit the
institute  agenda;  this  they  did  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  including  the  search  for
research funds, readily available publication venues, access to an enthusiastic reading
public, and prestige accorded to rubbing shoulders with bureaucrats and top policy-
makers.  The  ways  in  which  the  Cold  War  impacted  on  the  development  of  social
sciences and humanities in the western world has actually been studied in great detail
(Gilman 2003; Solovey; Cravens 2012; Price 2016). In any case, this lack of freedom in
choosing  one’s  research  question  and approach introduced  a  major  flaw into  their
otherwise academic work right from the beginning. The same kind of flaw afflicted and
could be observed in the work of other anticommunist research institutes elsewhere,
i.e. TKAE, which were modeled after the mother institution in Munich.
 
II. Context 2: The Domestic
14 In order to understand the emergence of the TKAE in 1961 ‑ literally, out of the blue ‑
and policies and concerns that paved the way for its foundation, we also need to place
this institution in its domestic context, recognizing the fact that home factors played a
role  as  much  as  the  international  did.  The  1960s  was  a  special  decade  because,
alongside Turkey, studies on Greece (Kazamias 2002-2003), Ireland (Delaney 2011), Italy
(Del  Pero  2001;  Jachec  2005),  and  Spain  (Wilhelm  1998)  show  that  right-wing
establishment  elites  in  those  countries,  too,  perceived  a  greater  threat  to  regime
stability and followed similar paths to deal with the “Red Peril.” One common feature
that  arises  from  those  studies  is  the  significance  of  the  right-wing  elites,  who
dominated national politics in many NATO countries at the time, and how their threat
perceptions were shaped by and, in return, prolonged the cultural Cold War. 
15 The worst nightmare of the Turkish establishment in the 1960s was the possibility of a
socialist takeover. Those worries were not totally unfounded. Turkey barely survived
threats from Stalin’s Russia at the beginning of the Cold War and was forced to give up
traditional neutrality and join NATO. Turkey was the only NATO country that shared a
common  border  with  the  USSR,  facing  the  threat  of  a  Soviet  invasion  of  NATO’s
southern flank. Turkish state elites found some consolation, however, in knowing that
there were very few socialists in Turkey in the 1940s and the 1950s, and those few had
virtually no impact on Turkish politics. Despite later attempts to amplify its weight and
impact, socialism arrived quite belatedly in the Ottoman-Turkish context and remained
weak  during  its  first  few  decades  (Tunçay  2009).  According  to  Kemal  Karpat,  “the
number of convinced leftists in Turkey . . .” in the immediate post-WWII years “. . .
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probably  never  exceeded  a  thousand”  (Karpat  1966:  177).  As  a  result,  socialism
advanced with baby steps initially and, while socialists were tolerated individually, all
attempts at organizing socialists into a movement were scuttled from the 1930s on.
State persecution of socialists intensified even further following Turkish membership
in NATO. Unlike most other NATO countries,  Turkey did not have a legal,  systemic
socialist or communist party in the early years of the Cold War. 
16 Things were going to change drastically in the aftermath of the military coup d’état in
1960. Learning lessons from the Democratic Party era (1950-1960) and determined to
prevent yet another domineering single-party government, the junta of young officers
took several measures to limit executive power in the future. Most importantly, the
1961 Constitution, which was drafted according to the wishes of the military:
a.  Created  a  neutral  president  (and  there  was  a  tacit  agreement  that  all  future
presidents were going to emerge from among the ranks of the officer corps),
b. Conceived new institutions (e.g. the Senate, the Constitutional Court, the National
Security  Council,  the  State  Planning  Organization),  which  were  meant  to  undercut
executive power,
c. Consolidated institutional autonomy of the judiciary and the universities as well as
civil liberties to block government intervention.
17 Furthermore, a new electoral law was adopted in 1961 that leaned toward proportional
representation in  spirit  and was  likely  to  produce  coalition governments  (as  it  did
between  1961  and  1965,  and  from  1973  to  1980).  All  in  all,  there  were  two  major
consequences of the 1960 Coup: First,  the Turkish military re-emerged as a decisive
political actor and established a military tutelage over civilian politics that was going to
last  until  the  1980  Coup  and  beyond;  and,  second,  the  Turkish  political  center
fragmented, thereby ending the two-party system of the 1950s and paving the way for
radical parties on the right and the left. 
18 The  Turkish  left  was  one  political  movement  that  reaped  the  benefits  of  the  new
environment the most. Indeed, if there is one defining characteristic of Turkey in the
1960s, that has to be the rise of the Turkish left. This was partly a result of changing
demographics. The number of wage earners in Turkey increased to nearly two million
in the 1960s (Karpat 1966: 177), creating a potential base for leftist politics. Right after
the coup, a new, Kemalist-socialist journal, Yön, began publication in 1961 and its first
issue contained a memorandum, or a socialist recipe for speedy development in Turkey.
The memorandum was undersigned by more than a thousand academics, journalists,
artists, authors, poets, a who’s who of Turkish intelligentsia at the time, showing the
broad appeal of socialism in the country (Lipovsky 1992: 85-108; Ulus 2011: 20-42). The
Turkish grande école, the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University, otherwise
known as the Mülkiye, which educates Turkey’s top bureaucrats, concurrently became
the focal point of socialist activism. While not so strong in the ballot box, the Turkish
Workers’  Party,  on  the  other  hand,  was  founded  in  1961  by  labor  unions  and
immediately  sent  shock  waves  through  the  establishment  with  its  eye-catching
propaganda tactics, effective opposition at the parliament, and, finally, with its party
support for Kurdish rights in Turkey (Lipovsky 1992: 9-82). The Turkish left, both at the
parliament and on the street, seemed to have a monopoly over ideas: Turkish leftists
could easily point at economic “miracles” such as the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba—of
course, little was known about the human cost of those miracles—and claimed that all
Turkey had to do was to follow the same path toward development, a claim which could
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hardly be matched by Turkish right-wing elites at the time. Concerns over the rapid
success  of  leftist  parties,  movements  and ideas  grew into alarm by 1968,  when the
global student movement finally reached Turkish campuses, and scores of radicalized
students  chose  armed struggle  against  the  government  as  the  legitimate  path  to  a
socialist  revolution  in  Turkey.  To  add another  layer  of  complexity,  socialism made
inroads into the Turkish military, winning over many junior, and occasionally senior,
officers as well (Ulus 2011).
19 The majority of the senior officer corps, however, was and remained solidly pro-NATO
and anticommunist. Toward the end of the 1960s, they were faced with a leftist tide,
which was partly their own creation. In this new atmosphere, the Turkish military,
arguably the most decisive actor in Turkish politics in the 1960s, was forced to resort to
new strategies to deal with this unexpected and unwanted challenge. The military’s
response manifested itself in several fronts. First, a slow but methodical purge removed
virtually  all  leftist  officers  from the  military  following the  military  intervention of
1971. In the same vein, the generals took the opportunity in the same year to impose an
amendment  of  the  1961  Constitution  that  reversed  its  liberal  character.  With  the
closure of  the Turkish Workers’  Party by court  order a  couple of  months after  the
military intervention (Aydın; Taşkın 2014: 206-207 and 223-228), the Turkish radical left
did not necessarily lose its effectiveness, but largely went underground and ceased to
be a systemic actor. 
20 The mastermind behind this political and legal onslaught against the left was no other
than a compact of senior generals. Particularly between 1966 and 1971, a triumvirate
composed of President Cevdet Sunay (General and former Chief of the General Staff,
1960-1966;  President  of  the  Turkish  Republic,  1966-1973),  General  Memduh Tağmaç
(Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  1969-1972),  and  Major  General  Fuat  Doğu  (head  of  the
Turkish secret service,  1962-1964 and 1966-1971) devised and coordinated measures
against  the  Turkish  left,  which  were  then  communicated  at  the  National  Security
Council to the center right Süleyman Demirel Government (1965-1969 and 1969-1971),
which was in collusion with them. Although the inaccessibility of official documents
make it impossible to ascertain the nature and the extent of those measures, historians
of the period are able to catch a glimpse of this powerful triumvirate from the diaries
and memoirs of Prime Minister Nihat Erim (1971-1972) and Minister of State and Vice-
Premier  Sadi  Koçaş  (1971).  Both Erim and Koçaş  describe  (and complain  about)  an
extremely powerful secret service, which even dared to spy on the leftist faction within
the main opposition party and its leader, future Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (Erim
2005: 945). Koçaş portrays the secret service boss, Fuat Doğu, as the man who fanned
the flames by sending a flood of anticommunist reports to Sunay and Tağmaç (Koçaş
1978: 104-165 and 202-203). It was Koçaş, in particular, who warned Fuat Doğu “not to
transgress the law” and “not to get involved in party politics” (Koçaş 1978: 119-120);
according to Koçaş: 
Chief of the General Staff [Memduh Tağmaç] is unfortunately totally under
the command of the President [Cevdet Sunay]. The President, on the other
hand, is under the influence of the Undersecretary of MİT [Fuat Doğu]. In
other words, they constitute a tripod . . . .[Fuat Doğu] has no regard for the
rule of law . . . (Koçaş 1978: 165)
21 When Erim and Koçaş finally decided to remove Doğu from power, this was discussed at
a National Security Council meeting and met with stiff resistance from the President
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and the Chief of the General Staff.  Sunay and Tağmaç surrendered only after Koçaş
threatened them with the resignation of the government. (Koçaş 1978: 241-252)
22 The evidence at hand reveals the commitment of the Turkish secret service, the MİT,
under Fuat Doğu, to arresting the expansion of leftist influence in Turkey at all fronts.
Under Cold War conditions, one could imagine that Doğu’s crusade against the left also
involved rallying public  opinion against  them,  and doing this  by implementing the
long-leash  policy  and  giving  a  boost  to  right-wing  civil  society  organizations  or
founding them where they did not exist. After all, it was extremely important to depict
state anticommunism as an outcome and a reflection of national sentiments; not only
did this  reinforce the already negative image of  the left  as  an alien abnormality,  a
tumor to be excised from the Turkish body, but it also helped the secret service to
occasionally outsource the excision operation to these organizations, which remained
in the orbit of the state elites in spite of their private, civil nature. As a matter of fact,
one could only marvel at the rapid increase after 1965 in the number of right-wing
organizations such as Mücadele Birliği (1967), Ülkü Ocakları (1968), Aydınlar Ocağı (1970)
Kubbealtı  Cemiyeti (1970), MİSK (1970) or the transformation and expansion of others
such as Millî Türk Talebe Birliği (1965), Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği (1965) and how this
period of right-wing activism overlapped with the tenure of Fuat Doğu at the MİT.
23 How could academic support for this anticommunist bloc be procured? What kind of
academic infrastructure and resources were available to combat leftist intellectuals?
Apart from very few institutions of higher education in Turkey in the 1960s, two very
important institutes could have been expected to join in, but did not. Türk Tarih Kurumu
(the Turkish History Institute) and Türk Dil  Kurumu (the Turkish Language Institute)
were  established  in  the  early  1930s  as  semi-private  societies,  which  nevertheless
maintained a privileged relationship with the Turkish state until the early 1950s. From
the  very  beginning,  they  dealt  with  humanities  with  a  special  emphasis  on  the
language(s) and history of the Turkic peoples, exactly the kind of academic knowledge
Fuat Doğu needed to support Turkish anticommunism. Both institutes were home to
researchers (émigrés or otherwise), who could speak Turkic dialects of Inner Eurasia
and do  original  research on the  Turkic  minority  groups  in  the  Soviet  Union;  their
libraries had already been accumulating standard reference works and monographs on
those subjects for decades. However, their contribution to the anticommunist struggle
in the 1960s can be described as minimal to non-existent.  Both institutes and their
cadres of research still  reflected concerns of the early republican Kemalist founders
dating  back  to  the  1930s,  which  was,  namely,  to  consolidate  an  Anatolia-centered
Turkish nation-state. The more academic of the two, Türk Tarih Kurumu, largely avoided
getting drawn into ideological fracas and, as its output and activities show, continued
its  tradition  of  Kemalist  prerogatives  under  two  long-serving  chairmen,  Şemsettin
Günaltay (1941 to 1961) and Şevket Aziz Kansu (1962-1973).  Türk Dil  Kurumu,  on the
other hand, had already made a name for being a bastion of left-wingers since the 1950s
and was in open conflict with right-wing intellectuals, who abhorred its revolutionary
language policy. With no significant support coming from these two institutes, the road
was paved for the foundation of a new one.
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III. The TKAE: Infrastructure, Goals, and Activities
24 The origins of the TKAE actually date back to the Democratic Party era. The founding
chairman  of  the  TKAE,  Ahmet  Temir1,  relates  in  his  memoirs  that  an  American
delegation arrived in Ankara in the 1950s to discuss the possibility of opening a branch
of the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR in Turkey to conduct research about
dış  Türkler,  Turks  or  Turkic  peoples  living  outside  the  boundaries  of  the  Turkish
Republic. While they lay bare the institutional linkage between Munich and the future
TKAE, these early contacts did not produce concrete results and were cut short by the
1960 Coup (Temir 2011: 215). However, something much more important was brewing
simultaneously in faraway Washington, DC, exposing further the American role in the
foundation  of  the  TKAE.  This  was  an  encounter  that  involved  two  very  unusual
characters, Alpaslan Türkeş and Ruzi Nazar, and both need a short introduction. 
25 Türkeş was a junior officer in the Turkish army and burdened with a checkered past. As
a young cadet, he was a protégé of the Turkish racist Nihal Atsız in late 1930s and was
imprisoned and appeared before a court in the Racism-Turanism Trials between 1944
and  1947.  He  was  eventually  acquitted  and  admitted  back  to  the  army,  advancing
swiftly thanks to his charismatic personality. He was going to get involved in the 1960
Coup and appointed as Undersecretary of the Prime Minister’s Office, a very powerful
office  which  he  held  for  four  months.  Fault  lines  emerged  soon  within  the  junta,
however, and Türkeş  was exiled to Delhi, where he was to stay until 1963. Upon his
return  to  Turkey,  Türkeş  established  and  led  Turkey’s  most  important  nationalist
party, the Nationalist Action Party, until his death in 1997 (Turgut 1995). Ruzi Nazar, on
the other hand was born an Uzbek citizen of the USSR, joined the Soviet army, and was
captured by the Nazis during the WWII. He, first, offered his services to his Nazi captors
and helped them organize the Turkestanischen Legion out of Turkic captives from the
Soviet army to fight against their former masters. When the Nazis were defeated by the
Allied powers, Nazar changed sides for a second time and was now recruited by the
American  intelligence.  He  climbed  the  hierarchical  ladder  and,  most  significantly,
served as the CIA case officer in Turkey from 1959 to 1971 (Altaylı 2013).
26 Nazar was of the opinion that the Soviet Union, despite its ostensible strength, had a
soft belly, and that was the nationalities question. He believed that Moscow had tried,
but not been able, to smother nationalism of dozens of ethnic minority groups under
the federal umbrella and Soviet power could be checked primarily by keeping national
aspirations  alive  and supporting  them whenever  possible  (Altaylı  2013:  367).  As  he
himself belonged to one of those minority groups, Nazar wanted to concentrate his
professional efforts on the Turkic peoples living in Soviet Central Asia and the Idil-Ural
region.  Of  course,  Turkey as  the  only  independent  Turkish state,  which also  was  a
prized  NATO ally  due  to  its  border  with  the  Soviet  Union,  constituted  the  natural
stepping-stone for the realization of this policy. 
27 To reach his goal, Nazar befriended Turks in Washington, DC, before he was eventually
posted to Ankara.2 This is how he approached Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş, who was in DC
and Arlington, Texas from 1955 to 1957 as part of the Turkish military delegation in
NATO; their acquaintance soon grew into a lifelong friendship (Altaylı 2013: 323-325).
Türkeş  must  have  known  Nazar’s  CIA  connection,  but  two  factors  seem  to  have
moderated  the  situation.  First,  those  were  the  initial,  euphoric  years  of  Turkey’s
admission to NATO as a  full  member and,  at  the height of  the Cold War,  the close
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rapport  between  a  Turkish  officer  and  the  American  intelligence  might  have  been
considered  less  of  a  problem.  Second,  and  more relevant,  the  two  men  shared  an
emphatic confidence in the future of Turkish nationalism and were, thus, bound by
ideological  ties,  as  well.  During  his  American  sojourn,  Türkeş  introduced  Nazar  to
another Turkish officer, a senior officer this time, Fuat Doğu, the future head of the
Turkish intelligence, who was also visiting the American capital for an extended stay
(Altaylı 2013: 355; Ülkü 2008: 136).
28 According to Altaylı ‑ and we should always take claims by a former intelligence officer
with a pinch of salt ‑ Fuat Doğu sought to re-organize the Turkish secret service and
endow it with a new set of goals. Turkish intelligence until the 1960s was weak and
primitive,  Altaylı  argues;  its  primary  focus  was  counter-espionage ‑  obstructing
operations by unfriendly nations on Turkish soil ‑ and providing logistical support to
allies and their intelligence services, which enjoyed far greater operational capabilities.
Doğu,  however,  wanted  to  change  this  and  create  a  more  powerful,  assertive  and
enterprising organization with two new and predominant roles:
1.  Psychological  warfare  against  legal  and illegal  groups  within  Turkey,  who,  Doğu
assumed, supported Soviet plans over Turkey,
2. Exploiting the nationalities question to bring down the Soviet enemy, and doing this
by, a) reviving old Muslim and Turkish espionage networks in the Soviet Union, dating
back to the Ottoman times, and b) recruiting personnel from within Turkey and from
the Turkic diaspora precisely for this purpose (Ülkü 2008: 141-144).
29 In other words, if we are to trust Altaylı verbatim, Fuat Doğu was suggesting a drastic
overhaul  of  the  traditional  Turkish  foreign  policy  vis-à-vis  the  Soviets  by  getting
directly involved in Russian domestic affairs with hostile intentions.  Altaylı  did not
even refrain from making a comparison with the demographic powerbase of the Israeli
intelligence service, the Mossad. If the Mossad scored great success by making recourse
to collaborators from among the Jewish diaspora around the globe, opined Altaylı, how
much  more  could  the  Turkish  MİT  achieve,  when  Turkey  renewed  ties  with  and
mobilized the 200 million strong Turkic diaspora, dispersed over vast areas in Eurasia?
Information gathering on such a scale would help not only against the Soviet Union and
Communist China, but it could also be useful against Turkey’s unfriendly neighbors, the
pro-Soviet  regimes  in  Syria,  Iraq  and  the  Balkans,  which  were  home  to  Turkic
minorities (Ülkü 2008: 167).
30 We will probably never know if the inspiration for Doğu’s bold ideas came from Nazar
and  the  CIA,  but  what  we  know for  a  fact  is  that  this  policy  argument  was  taken
seriously,  at  least  by  some  in  the  Turkish  establishment,  because  Colonel  Türkeş,
during those precious four months that he exercised power in Ankara, spared the time
to initiate the TKAE project as the first step toward the realization of this long-term
goal (Altaylı 2013: 363). The TKAE was not born as a fantasy of Türkeş alone; following
the exile  of  Türkeş  to  Delhi,  the project  found another protector in General  Cemal
Gürsel,  the  nominal  head  of  the  1960  Coup  and,  later,  president  of  Turkey,  who
intervened to prevent the closure of the institute (Altaylı 2013: 363). Indeed, there were
in the Turkish establishment formidable opponents of Doğu’s policy proposal such as
İsmet İnönü, whose weight cannot be overestimated. İnönü belonged to the founders’
generation, served as prime minister and president for many years and, after 1950, as
the leader of the main opposition party. Regarded by many as a foreign policy wizard,
İnönü hated adventurism and represented a cautious, coolheaded approach to decision-
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making (Heper 1998: 56-89), which he considered a balancing act. Given İnönü’s well-
known restraint, he could not have been expected to show interest in Turkic peoples
living  beyond  Turkey’s  borders,  let  alone  drawing  the  ire  of  Turkey’s  northern
neighbor. Altaylı describes a particular scene in his memoirs that sums up the clash of
mentalities  in  a  nutshell.  Right  after  his  arrival  in  Turkey in 1959,  Ruzi  Nazar was
introduced to İnönü, by Cüneyt Gökçer, Director of the State Theater and Opera, at the
Ankara Opera House. In this short meeting, Nazar attempted to convince İnönü that the
Soviet Empire was bound to collapse in the near future and drew İnönü’s attention to
the role  to  be  played by Muslim and Turkic  peoples  in  bringing the Soviets  down.
İnönü’s response was negative:  “Ruzi,  Ruzi”,  he is  said to have exclaimed,  “give up
these empty hopes, they [Muslim and Turkic peoples] have long been Russified.” For
İnönü, the fall of the Soviet regime was not imminent and not even in the horizon at
that moment; Turkey had to maintain peaceful relations with its irritable neighbor for
a long time to come and, therefore, any display of interest in Turkic peoples of Russian
lands  was  not  only  a  waste  of  money,  but  was  also  destined  to  provoke Moscow
unnecessarily  (Altaylı  2013:  367;  Ülkü  2008:  149).  İnönü  refused  to  jump  on  the
anticommunist bandwagon.
31 Altaylı  viewed İnönü and the like as  remnants of  early republican isolationism and
called them Misak-ı Milliciler, who could not adjust to growing Turkish power during the
Cold War (Ülkü 2008: 167). Despite objections, the TKAE project was launched in 1960
and a commission was set up to prepare the statute of the institute. Members of the
commission were Abidin İtil  (1910-1980),  an Indologist at Ankara University,  Osman
Nedim Tuna (1923-2001),  a  philologist  of  Old Turkic,  and Ahmet Temir (1912-2003),
Turcologist and specialist in Mongolian studies at Ankara University. İtil was born in
Baku, Azerbaijan and Temir in Kazan, making them ex officio representatives of dış
Türkler on  the  TKAE board.  The  three-men commission  submitted  its  proposal  and
statute to the Ministry of Interior and the TKAE was officially founded on 20 October
1961. İtil served as chair of the institute for one year, but after his departure, Ahmet
Temir was appointed in İtil’s stead for a very long tenure from 1962 to 1975 (Temir
2011: 207-208). In 1968, the Turkish government granted the TKAE the special status of
a “society that works for public benefit/kamu yararına çalışan dernek”, which comes with
certain  privileges  and,  more  than  anything  else,  shows  the  insider  status  of  an
otherwise private, civil society organization. Temir underlines the period from 1961 to
1973 as the most fruitful years of the institute, when the TKAE had a regular budget, a
peak of 20 personnel, and accumulated a 10,000-volume library (Temir 2011: 219-220;
TKAE 1986:  12).  Although Temir  is  understandably  silent  about  the  source  of  their
income, Altaylı  divulges the information that Fuat Doğu contributed to the institute
budget from the MİT’s discretionary funds throughout this period (Altaylı 2013: 363).
32 Article 3 of its statute defined the TKAE’s job as “doing scientific research on, 1) history
and the ethnic situation of Turkish world, 2) Turkish dialects, folklore and art, 3) social
and  religious  problems  of  the  Turkish  world  and  its  geopolitical  standing.”  The
institute also aimed to provide funding to researchers and students, draw a common
road map [for the Turkish world],  and support publications and academic meetings
(Temir 2011: 216).  Temir spelled out the difference between the institute and other
universities  and research centers  on several  occasions  and emphasized that,  unlike
others, the TKAE “adopted the principle of merging scientific mentality with a national
perspective” (TKAE 1986: 5-6) and “studying meticulously its subject area within the
framework  of  national  interests  and  interpreting  them  according  to  an  ongoing
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historical continuum” (TKAE 1971: 10). To put it differently, Temir did not mince his
words and did not hide the raison d’être of his institute, which was clear to everyone
involved from the beginning. 
33 The principles which guided the work of the TKAE were explicitly spelled out in the
very first article, entitled “Our Aim and Our Way”, of the first issue of the institute
journal Türk Kültürü in November 1962. Published in the name of the editorial board,
but actually penned by Ahmet Temir, it declares the institute and the journal to be
above and independent of any contemporary ideology. Reading a few paragraphs of
this  article,  however,  shows  beyond  doubt  that  Temir  and  his  colleagues  did  not
consider  ethnic  nationalism  an  ideology:  with  references  to  Nietzche  and  Fichte,
nationalism  and  national  identity  appear  here  not  as  a  modern  construct  to  be
problematized, but rather as a fact and force of nature, a natural identity, not to be
questioned but to be embraced (TKAE 1962: 5-13). Left-wingers and communists who
dared  to  question  this  “fact”  strayed  away  from  reason  and  the  natural  course  of
history. Indeed, the predominant viewpoint in this and hundreds of other articles in
Türk Kültürü is  to bring all  speakers of  Turkic languages under the umbrella of  the
Turkish nation. Adopting a language and culture-based definition of nationhood, Temir
left no room for scientific subtleties such as the terms “Turkic”, “Turkish-speaking”, or
“Turkic-speaking” (Findley 2005: 21-55). Actually, Temir buttressed the point that the
work of the TKAE was going to be totally scientific, because the Turkishness of various
Turkic-speaking groups in Eurasia was nothing but scientific “truth” (TKAE 1962: 5). 
34 Nevertheless, it was also the intention of the founders to endow the institute with an
aura of academic respectability ‑ similar to the case of the mother institute in Munich ‑
by  restricting  membership  to  academic  elites.  The  initial  statute  of  1961  limited
eligibility  to  only  those  who held  a  PhD degree  and were  preferably  teaching at  a
respectable academic institution. Members were also expected to have made a name in
their fields with their scientific contributions on Turkish culture and, last but not least,
they were also expected to agree with the broader goals of the TKAE (Temir 2011: 217).
Following the academic tradition in the western world, membership was divided into
three: regular, corresponding and honorary. Of the 25 regular members, 15 seats were
reserved for academic dış Türkler, while the remaining 10 were to be appointed from
among Turkish citizens. It was soon brought to the attention of the institute that this
last stipulation was in conflict with the Turkish Law on Societies and duly deleted with
an amendment in 1962 (Temir 2011: 217).
35 It is not a coincidence that the TKAE kept a low and strictly academic profile from 1961
to  1965,  a  period that  overlapped with the  three  coalition governments  formed by
İsmet İnönü. Under the Demirel Governments (1965-1969 and 1969-1971), however, the
institute entered a stage of activism, which lasted until the mid-1970s. 1965 marked a
turning point, according to Altaylı, in that the newly elected Prime Minister Süleyman
Demirel expressed confidence in Fuat Doğu and supported his policy of reaching out to
dış Türkler. Although we need to interpret the Demirel-Doğu relationship with a more
critical  eye  than  Altaylı  suggests,  there  is  no  escaping  the  fact  that  the  Demirel
Government drafted a new law in 1965, completely re-organizing the Turkish secret
service, and appointed Fuat Doğu as its boss for a second tenure in 1966 (İlter 2002).
From  then  on,  the  TKAE  increased  its  activities  in  terms  of  both  publications  and
academic meetings. It published several volumes of Cultura Turcica, an academic annual
in foreign languages, Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları,  an academic annual in Turkish, and
The Flagship Institution of Cold War Turcology
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 24 | 2017
13
Türk Kültürü, a monthly semi-popular journal. The TKAE also sponsored publication of a
series of monographs ‑ several hundred volumes in all, since its foundation in 1961 to
this  day ‑  on all  aspects  of  Turkic  history and culture (TKAE 1995).  Its  best-known
contribution, on the other hand, is a humongous, quarto size and 1500-page handbook
of Turkish studies, Türk Dünyası El Kitabı, which appeared in 1976 and has remained a
classic in the field ever since (TKAE 1976). The TKAE also sponsored and hosted the 16th
Permanent International Altaistic Conference in Ankara in 1973, and a secret, three-day
conference in Ankara in 1971, where participants from the Turkish intelligence and the
military  met  representatives  of  the  Turkic  diaspora,  invited  by  Fuat  Doğu  for  this
special occasion (Ülkü 2008: 178-179). This stage of activism came to a conclusion when
Prime Minister Erim and Vice-Premier Koçaş in 1971 turned the spotlights on the MİT
and removed Doğu from office despite resistance from the president and the military.
With his financial and moral support cut off, Ahmet Temir was to follow suit and resign
as director of the TKAE in 1975. From the mid-1970s on, there was a visible decline in
the activities of the institute and its influence over policy-making. It still survives to
this day, primarily as an academic research institution and a meeting and publication
venue for nationalist Turcologists.
36 A closer look at the most popular publication of the TKAE, the journal Türk Kültürü
(Turkish Culture) and its editorial policy from 1962 to 1980 imparts further insights
into the ideological makeup of this Cold Warrior institute. I aim to do this by providing
a numerical content analysis of a total of 1826 articles published in Türk Kültürü from
1962 to 1980. The articles are categorized according to their title and contents under
two main subheadings: a) themes (Atatürk, nationalism, Turkish culture, education in
Turkey, communism, Turkish left, Russia, important Turkish figures, other), b) Turkic
communities  according  to  country/region  of  origin  (Balkans,  Middle  East,  Cyprus,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Crimea, Caucasus,  Turkestan, Turkish groups
without state). In Table 1, the number of articles published in each category is given in
a yearly breakdown, and Table 2 presents the same information in percentages. It must
be stressed again at this point that Türk Kültürü did not have any pretensions to be a
strictly scientific journal. On the contrary, most of the articles are short and do present
a mixture of facts and subjective convictions, which disclose the ideological leaning of
their authors. Occasionally, however, articles that excelled above others in terms of
method, research and content also appeared in Türk Kültürü, reflecting the status the
journal held among Turkish scholars of Turcology. 
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37 Overall,  the  predominant  theme  in  Türk  Kültürü was  the  Turkish  culture  itself.  To
repeat,  the editorial board had a very expansive definition of both Turkishness and
culture: while all Turkic-speaking communities were subsumed under the category of
“Turks”, articles which dealt with the culture of these groups, dwelled on anything
from political culture to child-rearing practices, from shamanism, occult and magic to
music and health. With the exception of a few years, articles under this category made
up more than a fifth of the total number of articles published annually, and sometimes
reached nearly half. Another visible theme, particularly until and including 1970 (and
unsurprisingly, post-coup issues in 1980) is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose deeds and
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thoughts were given regular coverage. The stress in Türk Kültürü on Atatürk ought to be
seen as a response to the Yön Movement, a Kemalist-leftist group of intellectuals and
their supporters in the civil and military bureaucracy during the 1960s, who wanted to
derive  legitimacy  for  left-wing  interventionism  from  a  newly-constructed  image  of
Atatürk as an anti-imperialist revolutionary. Temir and his colleagues engaged in this
battle  over  Atatürk’s  soul  and claimed him as  one of  their  own,  a  nationalist  hero
struggling against all kinds of imperialism, including the Russian-Soviet. Finally, a large
proportion of each issue of Türk Kültürü was reserved for the dış Türkler. Although the
material  conditions  of  Turkic  communities  living  under  socialist  regimes  and
infringements  on  their  rights  and  well-being  received  special  attention,  Turkic
minority groups in Greece and the Middle East were not forgotten either.
38 The case of Cyprus in this regard is very indicative of not only the attention paid to dış
Türkler,  but  also  for  revealing  fluctuations  in  editorial  policy  and  how  the  editors
responded  to  exigencies  of  the  moment  and  possibly  to  political  demands  for
supporting  Turkish  foreign  policy  through  academic  publications.  The  London  and
Zurich Agreements of 1959 paved the way for the creation of an independent Republic
of Cyprus in 1960, but the Cypriot confessional political system failed to provide a basis
for peaceful  relations between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority on the
island. As inter-communal clashes accelerated, successive Turkish governments in the
1960s threatened to intervene as a guarantor power, and the Ecevit Government finally
did so in 1973, carving out a Turkish enclave in the north which eventually became the
diplomatically unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, Turkey
collided with Greece, post-intervention Greek-led Cyprus and Greek lobbies in the west
in a propaganda battle to convince western public opinion ‑ and of course the academia
‑  that the Turkish argument was right. We observe how this propaganda effort was
reflected in the pages of Türk Kültürü. There is a significant increase in the number of
articles on Cyprus in 1964 and 1965, when İnönü-led coalition governments threatened
to intervene and were rebuffed by the Johnson Administration in the USA. Parallel to
the  upsurge  in  communal  conflict  in  the  early  1970s,  we  see  another  peak  in  the
number of Cyprus-related articles in Türk Kültürü, reaching 14.29 percent following the
Turkish intervention. To show the importance of Cyprus on their academic agenda, the
TKAE board created in  1969 a  special  academic commission to  work exclusively  on
Cyprus (TKAE 1986: 15) and published five books by 1975 (TKAE 1975: 12). 
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39 There are several conclusions to be drawn from this micro-study on the Türk Kültürünü
Araştırma Enstitüsü. First, when put into its proper contexts, the TKAE episode shows
the extent to which the Cold War shaped intellectual debates in Turkey, in general, and
manipulated the trajectory of Turcology, again, in Turkey, in particular. The study of
Turkish history and language in Turkey was instrumentalized by state authorities since
the beginning of  the republic  ‑  one may push this  as  far back as the CUP period ‑
because  the  Turkish  state  demanded  scientific  or  pseudo-scientific  knowledge  for
fulfilling its own ‑ usually called “national” ‑ interests. Türk Tarih Kurumu and Türk Dil
Kurumu represent  the  first  wave  of  institution-building  for  political  ends,  ie.
consolidating the Turkish nation-state  and assuring for  it  a  prestigious  spot  in  the
global  political  hierarchy of  the 1930s.  Those first-generation academic institutions,
however, could hardly supply useful knowledge in the new context of the Cold War,
and, therefore, the TKAE ought to be considered a follow-up in the spirit of the same
tradition,  an expression of  the same state instinct  of  survival.  The Cold War factor
exerted so much pressure on domestic politics that factions within the Turkish state
elite contemplated transcending the Kemalist nation-state model and expanding the
definition of Turkishness to include dış Türkler as a viable policy line to contain Soviet
plans  over  Turkey.  Turcology,  in  other  words,  was  now  being  harnessed  by
anticommunism to further and promote a new set of political  objectives.  What sets
apart the 1960s from the 1930s and the second wave from the first, on the other hand,
is the multiparty democracy context, in which state elites were now divided over what
really constituted “national interests” and did not act in unison. The rise and fall of the
TKAE is an excellent example of this quarrel over policy-making. 
40 Second, the foundation of the TKAE allows us a rare peek into the interplay between
the  international  and  the  domestic.  For  the  USA,  Turkey’s  proximity  to  the  Soviet
Union offered opportunities for collecting information, while the Turkic peoples living
under the Soviet regime as well as the vast Turkic diaspora around the world could be
tapped into to meddle in Russian domestic affairs. On the other side of the coin, the
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1960s witnessed the crystallization of a right-wing elite pact in Turkey, composed of
senior generals, the intelligence service, and the center-right Demirel Governments, on
the basis of a common anticommunist platform. Although not entirely unopposed, this
elite pact experimented with changing Turkey’s traditional foreign policy vis-à-vis the
Soviets in order to roll back the Turkish left. Strong reaction from within the Turkish
establishment against this experiment ultimately foiled the attempt, but the fact that
such a bold idea was toyed with, even briefly, is a testimony to the shaping power of the
international over identity formation. 
41 Finally, at a macro level, research on the TKAE leads us to question one of the salient
clichés  in  the  study  of  20th  century  Turkish  history.  The  post-Kemalist  paradigm,
which dominated modern Turkish studies for the past 30 years posited a clean break
between  Kemalist,  westernizing  elites  versus  a  mass  of  conservative  right-wingers.
Actually, post-Kemalists defined this fault line, which supposedly divides the Turkish
political and intellectual world into two antagonistic camps, as the main problematique
of  Turkish politics.  Yet,  too much emphasis  on the fault  line  argument  resulted in
unintended reification of the concepts of “Kemalism” and “conservatism” as Weberian
ideal-types:  post-Kemalist  scholars  stressed  and  amplified  conflict,  rather  than
collaboration,  and  anticipated  so-called  “Kemalists”  and  so-called  “enemies  of
Kemalism” to fit into an arbitrarily constructed binary opposition. Just like in the story
of the proverbial  Procrustean bed,  atypical  features and characteristics of  these so-
called enemies, or common interests and agendas that occasionally united both sides of
the  fault  line,  were  dropped  from  the  dominant  narrative.  As  a  result  of  this
paradigmatic  myopia,  many  hybrid  figures,  ideas  and  movements  were  either
misrepresented or  hidden from view.  The TKAE is  one such example of  a  research
institute, in this case, which clearly represented the convergence of the interests of the
Kemalist establishment, on the one hand, and the Turkish right, on the other. 
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NOTES
1. Ahmet Temir’s bio resembles the bios of the founders of the Munich Institute in uncanny ways.
He spent the years 1936 to 1943 in Germany as a Nazi collaborator. He worked for the German
Ostministerium, organizing and integrating Soviet Turkic POWs into the Nazi war machine. 
2. Nazar’s role in spotting and bringing individual right-wingers into a common network and
forming  a  bloc  of  Turkish  anticommunists  cannot  be  overstated.  Nearly  all  major  Turkish
newspapers and news portals announced his passing in 2015 at the ripe age of 98, speaking in
awe of the man’s talent and achievements. An eulogy on the website of the Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty carried a picture of Nazar at old age and holding a bound volume of Türk Kültürü,
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the institute journal of the TKAE; see “Central Asian Cold Warrior Ruzi Nazar Dies in Turkey”,
(https://www.rferl.org/a/ruzi-nazar-obituary-uzbekistan-cold-war-warrior-spy/26994013.html),
accessed on 01 July 2017. 
ABSTRACTS
The study of the cultural Cold War, the untold story of how the USA and the USSR employed and
often exploited the academia and the arts for war purposes, is now a particularly fruitful line of
inquiry, but it has scarcely reached the field of Turkish studies. This article focuses on the Türk
Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü (TKAE), founded in Ankara in 1961. Ostensibly, the TKAE was an
academic institute,  doing research on the Turkic world;  however,  its  political  objectives,  as I
attempt to show, went far beyond the scholarly confines of academia. I will first describe the Cold
War environment in which the TKAE was born by putting this institution into its international
and domestic contexts in two separate sections. Proving the convergence of American interests
and the interests of right-wing Turkish elites is going to be my goal here. Next, I will provide
information about the foundation of the TKAE, its institutional structure, membership, aims and
activities.  Finally,  I  will  conclude  by  discussing  what  the  TKAE  episode  teaches  us  in
understanding Cold War Turkey. 
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